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"A drop of oil is equal to a drop of human blood."
So said Ferdinand Foch, the famous French Field Marshall after World War I. Foch indeed had experienced at first hand warfare being revolutionized by the advent of new war machines such as tanks and airplanes, all of which could not be mobilized or used without adequate supplies of oil. Besides, the countless number of men-of-war had begun to convert their boilers to burn oil instead of coal. Oil had now become of the most crucial elements of modern war making.
Confronted with this new situation, Japan was forced to depend on foreign sources for oil, as domestic production was meager. Japan's crude oil production within her border for 1931 was 291,000 kiloliters; 1933 was 330,000 kl, 1935 was 268,000 kl, and 1937 was 335,000 kl. These amounts represented roughly less than 0.1% of US production, 0.5% of Russia, and 1.6% of the Netherlands from the Dutch East Indies (1).
Japan's traditional and primary source of oil up to the outbreak of war was the US (California), and Dutch Borneo. Other sources were Sakhalin (Russia), where Japan had a concession in the Oha Field, Mexico, Persia and British Borneo.
Japan's dependency on America for its oil and oil products was a predominant 67% of total oil imports in 1935 (2,310,000 kl), 74% in 1937 (3,530,000 kl), and 90% less than two years before the Pacific War broke out in 1939 (4,450,000 kl) (2) !
This heavy dependency on the US for such a vital element of war making was tantamount to willingly placing its life int he hands of the United States, which was fast turning into a potential enemy. The US could squeeze Japan where it hurt the most, and do so at any time it pleased. And this would be played out soon.
In order to protect her interests, Japan began to furiously :
She even went to the extent of making synthetic oil from coat at a very heavy cost. The effects of these efforts, however, did not make much of a dent in the overall oil supply situation of having to depend on foreign oil.
Japan's expansion of its Lebensraum (or living space) into Manchuria in 1931, and into North China in 1937 was a cause of irritation to the world community, especially the US, which began to exercise measures to place econmic pressure against Japan. In July 1938, the United States placed a moral embargo against Japan on US aeronautical equipment and related material. This embargo was further tightened in December 1938, and upgraded to a legal embargo in January 1939.
In November 1938, Japan's Prime Minister at the time, Fumimaro Konoe, issued a statement that Japan was going to establish a new order in Greater East Asia. This angered the US, especially President Roosevelt to no end. After a long and thorough consideration, on 26 July 1939, the 1911 US-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was unilaterally abrogated, to take effect six months later. This was a clear signal of United States intentions to continue applying economic pressures on Japan in retaliation against Japan's insatiable advances in the Far East.
This action by the United States shocked many Japanese leaders, one of them being then Finance Minister Sotaro Ishiwata. On 5 August 1939 he reported to the Emperor his opinion regarding the effects of the abrogation of the treaty :
"It is a great blow to our access to scrap iron and oil. Although there is room for further imports during the next six months, what happens after that? There will be great difficulties Japan will have to face. Unless the strength of the Army and Navy is reduced to one third of its present size, there is no way Japan can keep going." (3)
This civilian cabinet minster was telling the Emperor, in no uncertain terms, that his military boys should be cut down to size or else his country would go down the drain. Japan, however, showed no signs of letting up, and the United States continued to tighten the screws.
In December 1939, a moral embargo was placed on exports to Japan of technical knowhow related to liquid fuel, tightened in April 1940, and placed on the export approval list in September 1940. In July 1940, after Nazi Germany overran western continental Europe, restrictions on exports to Japan of liquid fuel, especially aviation gasoline, went into effect. This began with high octane gasoline and gradually expanded to lower octane gas.
In this way, economic pressure was adroitly applied and gradually brought to bear on Japan in stages. This avoided over stimulating Japan into taking drastic measures against the US, as America was not yet fully prepared for war.
On 26 July 1940, the following items were placed on the US export approval list :
On 31 July 1940, all export of US avgas was banned, except to the Western hemisphere. Gas with an octane rating of 87 or lower was still exportable at this time.
These measures delivered a mortal blow to Japan's aviation capability, which had been heavily dependent on US avgas. They force Japan to harden its resolve to make a southward thrust to gain possession of the rich oil fields of the Dutch East Indies.
The eruption of turmoil in eastern Europe caused a rush by the western powers to gain access to any oil supplies that could possibly be made available to them. Meanwhile, Japan attempted to secure oil sources outside of the US, but she realized that the greatest potential source and opportunity lay in the Dutch East Indies.
In September of 1940, a high level Japanese mission was sent to Batavia (Jakarta) to negotiate oil concessions in Sumatra, Java, Borneo and Ceram, with the intent to purchase one million tons of oil per year in each of the following five years. This mission failed to achieve any results, and another delegation was sent in January 1941. This mission also failed, owing to an obstinate refusal by the Dutch to come to terms. The leader of the second mission was so frustrated, that unlike a former career diplomat and once Foreign Minister, he reported to the government:
"To solve the Dutch East Indies issue over oil there is no way but to resort to force." (4)
On 25 July 1941, the US froze all Japanese assets in America. Britain and the Netherlands followed a day later. The noose had begun to tighten. Three days later Japanese forces marched "peacefully" into southern French Indo China under an agreement with the French Vichy government. Singapore and Manila were now within reach of the Japanese military, and retaliation by the US came fast and hard.
On 1 August 1941, the US embargoed all exports to Japan, subject to some exceptions (5). The US had squeezed hard to emasculate Japan. To most leaders in Japan this action came as a great surprise. As the stationing of troops in Indo China was done peacefully under a negotiated agreement with the French, there was little fear of American retalitory action. Of course this was one sided, wishful thinking at best.
This determined action by the United States turned Japan's greatest fear into a most dreaded reality, the cut off of her main source of oil. With the reserves on hand, Japan's fighting machine would come to a grinding halt in roughly two years, perhaps less, without the US ever having to resort to open warfare. A drop of oil had indeed become a drop of blood to Japan. In fact this still holds true for many nations, especially the highly industrialized ones, as evidenced by the Desert Storm operation in our recent memory.
The Imperial Army and Navy immediately took stock of their respective oil holdings, now that oil was no longer available from the US.
By the middle of 1941, the Army had the following reserves :
|
Army Oil Reserves August 1941 |
Aviation Gasoline |
Motor Vehicle Gasoline |
|
In Stock |
385,000 kl |
350,000 kl |
|
Monthly Consumption |
15,000 kl |
17,500 kl |
|
Number of Months Sustainable |
25.6 |
20 |
This meant that Japan's Army machine would be "out of gas" in 1.5 to 2 years (6).
The Navy's inventory was more sophisticated the the Army's. It took the form of demand-supply estimates, as shown here for 1 August 1941 :
|
|
|
1st Year |
5,400,000 kl |
|
2nd Year |
5,400,000 kl |
|
3rd Year |
5,400,000 kl |
|
|
|
|
|
1st Year |
800,000 kl |
|
southern oil |
300,000 kl |
|
domestic oil |
200,000 kl |
|
synthetic oil |
300,000 kl |
|
2nd Year |
3,340,000 kl |
|
southern oil |
2,440,000 kl |
|
domestic oil |
200,000 kl |
|
synthetic oil |
700,000 kl |
|
3rd Year |
6,670,000 kl |
|
southern oil |
4,770,000 kl |
|
domestic oil |
400,000 kl |
|
synthetic oil |
1,500,000 kl |
|
|
|
1st Year |
4,800,000 kl (2,500,000 kl) |
|
2nd Year |
2,740,000 kl (440,000 kl) |
|
3rd Year |
4,010,000 kl (1,710,000 kl) |
The figures in parenthesis for year end inventories denote the remaining supply after deducting the absolute minimum reserve of 1,500,000 kl. This figure represented 500,000 kl for a final decisive battle, 1,000,000 kl for civilian reserves, plus an additional 800,000 kl that lay at the bottom of storage tanks and was unusable.
Because stocks were estimated to be consumed at a monthly rate of 450,000 kl, the Navy opined that the war must be started during October 1941, or else there would be a fear of oil shortages beginning toward the end of the second year of war wit the Allies (7).
On the other hand, the government had its Director General of the Planning Board report to the Emperor and Impeial Council on the supply and demand on the nation's oil on 5 November 1941. He presented the following figures :
|
|
|
1st Year |
5,200,000 kl |
|
Army |
1,000,000 kl |
|
Navy |
2,800,000 kl |
|
Civilian |
1,400,000 kl |
|
2nd Year |
5,000,000 kl |
|
Army |
900,000 kl |
|
Navy |
2,700,000 kl |
|
Civilian |
1,400,000 kl |
|
3rd Year |
4,750,000 kl |
|
Army |
950,000 kl |
|
Navy |
2,500,000 kl |
|
Civilian |
1,400,000 kl |
|
|
|
In Stock Prior to War |
8,400,000 kl |
|
Army |
1,200,000 kl |
|
Navy |
6,500,000 kl |
|
Civilian |
700,000 kl |
|
In Stock Prior to War |
8,400,000 kl |
|
Army |
1,200,000 kl |
|
Navy |
6,500,000 kl |
|
Civilian |
700,000 kl |
|
1st Year |
850,000 kl |
|
southern oil |
300,000 kl |
|
domestic oil |
250,000 kl |
|
synthetic oil |
300,000 kl |
|
2nd Year |
2,600,000 kl |
|
southern oil |
2,000,000 kl |
|
domestic oil |
200,000 kl |
|
synthetic oil |
400,000 kl |
|
3rd Year |
5,300,000 kl |
|
southern oil |
4,500,000 kl |
|
domestic oil |
300,000 kl |
|
synthetic oil |
500,000 kl |
|
|
|
1st Year |
4,050,000 kl (2,550,000 kl) |
|
2nd Year |
1,650,000 kl (150,000 kl) |
|
3rd Year |
2,200,000 kl (700,000 kl) |
These figures demonstrated that there would be a shortage of oil towards the end of the 2nd year of war (8).
Oil inventories on hand for the Army by area in November 1941 were :
|
Army Oil Reserves November 1941 |
Aviation Gasoline |
Motor Vehicle Gasoline |
|
Japan |
88,000 kl |
140,000 kl |
|
Southern Theater |
20,000 kl |
40,000 kl |
|
Northern Theater |
50,000 kl |
125,000 kl |
|
China |
7,000 kl |
42,000 kl |
|
Total Army Inventories |
165,000 kl |
347,000 kl |
On the whole, the Army estimated it could sustain operations for 1.5 to 2 years, but no longer (9).
Oil inventories on hand for the Navy on 8 August 1941 were :
|
Aviation Gasoline |
477,500 kl |
|
Aero Lube Oil |
6,470 kl |
|
Ordinary Lube Oil |
13,000 kl |
|
ISO Octane |
26,926 kl |
|
Ethyl Fluid |
61,000 kl |
|
Crude Oil |
1,435,000 tons |
|
Fuel Oil |
3,624,000 tons |
|
Total Navy Inventories |
5,883,557 kl |
Total Navy holdings represented approximately 80% of Japan's total. According to Navy estimates, this amount of avgas could sustain operations up to only 1.5 years (10).
&endash; 14 May 1996, Minoru Kawamoto
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Sources
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1. p383, Daihonei Kagunbu-Rengo Kantai (1), Senshi Sosho (General Headquarters Navy Department-Combined Fleet (1), War History Series) |
|
2. p383, ibid |
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3. p386, ibid |
|
4. p312, Rikugun Kokuno Gunbi to Unyo (2), Senshi Sosho (Army Air Force War Preparation and Operations (2), War History Series) |
|
5. p393-394, Daihonei Rikugunbu Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (4), Senshi Sosho (General Headquarters Army Department, Situation Leading to the Greater East Asia War (4), War History Series) The exceptions made here were (1), low grade gasoline, crude oil and lubrication oil, which would require export license and defreezing of funds for payment, and (2), raw cotton and foodstuffs. All other goods were embargoed. The US left a bait hanging to keep Japan from going further southward. Japan regarded this action as essentially a total embargo, and did not bite. |
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6. p346, Rikugun Kokuno Gunbi to Unyo (2), Senshi Sosho (see 4. above) |
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7. p537, Daihonei Kaigunbu-Rengo Kanti (2), Senshi Sosho (General Headquarters Navy Department-Combined Fleet (2), War History Series) |
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8. p731-733, Kaigun Gunsenbi (1), Senshi Sosho (Navy War Preparation (2), War History Series) |
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9. p339, Rikugun Gunsenbi, Senshi Sosho (Army War Preparation, War History Series) |
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10. p728, Kaigun Gun Senbi (1), Senshi Sosho (Navy War Preparation (1), War History Series) |
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11. p40, Showa no Rekishi, (7) Taiheiyo Senso, Junichiro Kisaka, Shogakukan (History of the Showa Era, (7) Pacific War, Author Junichiro Kisaka, publisher Shogakukan) |
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12. p176, ibid The "surplus oil" here was ordinary gasoline and kerosene. |
MF Note: Notes 11 and 12 are shown only in this list, and not in the text of the document. This leads me to believe that Mr. Kawamoto may have accidently excluded 1 page, and I will have to check with him on this.
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