All SNLF units underwent extensive training in assault, beach defense, anti-aircraft, amphibious and infantry tactics. Certain units also trained as paratroopers, and were the only Navy units so prepared.
Like all other units formed late in the war, SNLF units raised in 1944 and 45 would have recieved more limited training and have been lower quality troops. However those that operated in the early war were well trained, elite units.
Before we discuss the actual SNLF units, it is important to note that other Japanese Naval ground units are often confused with the Special Naval Landing Forces. We'll start with a little terminology :
|
Tokubetsu Rikusentai |
Special Naval Landing Force (746-3251 men) |
|
Keibitai |
Guard Unit (200-500 men) |
|
Bobitai (also called Boei-han) |
Defense Unit (200-400 men) |
|
Tsushintai |
Communication Unit (600-1000 men) |
All four types of the above ground units are often referred to as "Japanese Marines" in the same way the SNLFs were. However while the Keibitai and Bobitai did indeed receive amphibious and beach defense training, it was less extensive than that of the SNLF, and these units performed in pretty average fashion, sometimes quite poorly.
It is the mistaken translation and reference to these units as SNLF which causes the problems with identification. Because of type misidentification, some historians have classed SNLFs as mediocre troops, when they were mostly of very high quality and elan.
|
|
Organized 15 Nov 1940, then engaged in Hainan Island operation. Attached to Combined Fleet 20 November 1941, assigned to 3rd Fleet. Ordered to Palau under Commander FUJIMURA Seiryo. Fixed number of 1401 men. |
|
|
Organized 15 October 1941 under Commander MAKIUCHI Tadao. Fixed number of 1401 men. Ordered to Palau. |
|
|
Total 1069 men, part of the garrison at Truk in the Carolines when the Pacific War broke out. |
|
|
Probably 746 men, commander unknown. Placed under 3rd China Contingent Fleet, and located at San-a Hainan on 8 December 1841. Most of 1 company detached to 4th Fleet for invasion of Wake Island. |
|
|
Organized 15 November 1940, then engaged in Hainan Island operation. Attached to Combined Fleet 20 November 1941, assigned to 3rd Fleet. Ordered to Palau under Commander SHIGA Masanari. Fixed number of 1622 men. |
|
|
Organized 15 October 1941. Fixed number of 1437 men under Command HASHIMOTO Uroku. Assigned to 3rd Fleet and moved to Palau prior to start of war. |
|
|
On 20 November 1941 the Sasebo 1st and 2nd SNLF were combined into this unit, with the addition of a headquarters unit of 192 men. Fixed number of 3251 under command of Rear Adm MORI Kunizo. |
|
|
Probably 746 men, commander unknown. Placed under 3rd China Contingent Fleet, and located at San-a, Hainan on 8 December 1941. |
|
|
Probably 746 men, commander unknown. Placed under Shanghai Naval Base Force and located at Shanghai, Kiangsu Province, China on 8 December 1941. |
|
|
The 1001st Butai (unit) consisted of the Yokosuka 1st and 3rd Special Naval Landing Forces along with the the 1001st Naval Air Group. This was the main Navy paratrooper unit. |
|
|
Organized 20 September 1941 under Commander HORIUCHI Toyoaki. Fixed number of 849 men, of which 750 were jump trained. On 20 November 1941 the unit was split up to provide a nucleus for the Yokosuka 3rd SNLF, but was brought back up to strength prior to December 1941. Stationed at San-a, Hainan on 8 December 1941. |
|
|
|
|
|
This was the paratroop transport unit, and consisted of 25 x L3Y1 and 1 x G6M-L2 planes. The L3Y aircraft were converted Nell bombers, the G6M converted Betty heavy escort fighters (which were a failed attempt prior to the Pacific War to provid a long range escort fighter for bombers, they performed poorly and were no longer needed with the advent of the Zero, so all were converted to transports). Under command of Capt ARAKI Keikichi. Note: The entire 1001st Butai was placed under command of the 11th Naval Air Fleet, and assigned to the 21st Naval Air Flotilla. The aircraft were at Chia-i, Formosa on 8 December 1941. |
|
|
Organized 15 October 1941 under Commander TOMONARI Kiyoshi. Fixed number of 746 men, all jump trained. Placed under the Nanken Kantai (Southern Fleet) and moved to San-a, Hainan, then moving to Cam Ranh Bay, Indo China prior to the outbreak of war. Note: The Yokosuka 1st and 3rd SNLFs were the Navy's first paratrooper units. The first true fully equipped training drop took place on 16 November 1941 at Kasumigaura. |
|
|
Probably 746 men, commander unknown. Placed under 3rd China Contingent Fleet, and located at San-a, Hainan on 8 December 1941. |
|
|
Like most navies, the IJN had shipboard marine contingents on most warships of any significance. While the exact number of men assigned to most of these contingents is unknown, the following two units are noted for being part of initial war operations |
|
|
Composed of a small group of marines from the destroyer Amatsukaze, probably about 20-30 men. Part of the Davao Invasion Force after the parent ships performed other escort duties prior to the Davao landings. |
|
|
Composed of a small group of marines from the light cruiser Jintsu and destroyer Kuroshio, probably about 60 men. Part of the Davao Invasion Force after the parent ships performed other escort duties prior to the Davao landings. |
|
|
Began war at Pelilu in the Palaus and slated for the Davao Invasion Force, followed by occupation of Jolo Island. Sailed from Peliliu for Davao at 0700 on 17 December 1941. Not clear if it actually took part in the landings at Davao, but if it did it landed at 0515 on 20 December and helped occupy Davao town. Proceeded to Jolo, landing at 0120 nf 25 December, helping to occupy the airfield and Jolo town. |
|
|
Began war at Pelilu, were part of the 4th Raiding Force (Legaspi Operation), which sailed from at 0800 hours on 8 December 1941. Landing at around 1040 on the 12th, they participated with Army troops in occupying the Legaspi Airport. |
|
|
Began war onboard the Kinryu Maru, part of the 1st Invasion Group of the Wake Island Invasion Force. First landing attempts on 11 December 1941 driven off by shore batteries. This was the only time in the Pacific War that landings were prevented by fire from shore batteries. The invasion force retired to Kwajelein, awaiting support from Kido Butai (carriers Hiryu and Soryu). Reinforced by additional surface ships including heavy cruisers and the seplane tender Chitose, the Maizuru Naval Base SNLF from Truk, and other (probably Army) troops from the Nankai Detachment which had already occupied Guam, simultaneous landings were made on the southern shore of Wake and Wilkes Islands at 0235 on 23 December. After bitter fighting with the small but brave defense for us US Marines, Wake fell, officially surrendering between 0730 and 0800 on the 23rd, but in several places on the 3 small islands of Wake small groups of marines kept on fighting for several more hours. The Japanese may have suffered as many as 1100+ casualties, the majority of them killed. |
|
|
Began war onboard the 3rd Raiding Force (Luzon Straights Operation), at sea on 8 December 1941. Responsible for occupation of Batan Island in the Luzon Straights. These men then had to reboard their transports and move to and occupy Camiguin Island. They landed on Batan at 0750 on 8 December, and had occupied the airfield by 0950. Leaving the Army 24th Airfield Battalion, and the Navy 2nd Communication Unit and 3rd Defense Unit behind to occupy Batan, the SNLF platoons then reboarded their ships and moved to Camiguin, landing there at 0925 on 10 December. They were accompanied by merchant seaplane tender Sanuki Maru, which was to establish a base for floatplane operations on Camiguin to allows its aircraft to operate easily over the Aparri landing area. However the seas proved too rough for floatplane operations from this location, so it was closed down and all planes and personnel returned to Tung Ch'ang, Formosa on 14 December. |
|
|
Began war at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyus, part of the Lamon Bay Invasion Force. They sailed on 18 December, arriving at Lamon Bay in the early morning hours of 24 December. The SNLF platoons were responsible for occupation of two islands at the mouth of the harbor, and landed on both of them at 0800 on the 24th. |
|
|
Began war as part of the Miri and Seria Occupation Force. Sailed from Cam Ranh Bay at 0730 hours on 13 December 1941. Executed landings at Miri, British Borneo at 0440 on 16 December, occupying the Lutong Refinery by 0700 hours. The troops then reboarded their ships and continued on to Kuching at the southern end of British Borneo, landing there at 0400 hours on 24 December. Kuching was occupied by 1900 on the 24th. |
|
|
Began war onboard the 3rd Raiding Force (Luzon Straights Operation), at sea on 8 December 1941. This unit was responsible for occupying Calayan Island, where it landed at 1115 on 8 December 1941. It quickly established a 300 x 200 meter emergency landing strip and then returned to Takao, Formosa. |
|
|
These marines from the light cruiser Jintsu and destroyer Kuroshio landed at Davao at 0925 on 21 December 1941 after the main landings had been successfully completed. Responsible for rescue of Japanese civilians that had been interened after war broke out. Successfully release 191 Japanese civilians. Reboarded ships and landed again at 2300 on 21 December, releasing another 244 Japanese civilians from confinement. |
|
|
These marines from the destroyer Amatsukaze landed at 1545 hours on 22 December 1941 in Davao area, releasing 29 Japanese civilians that had been interned. |
In the early months of the war, SNLF units went on to particpate in a number of operations in the Dutch East Indies, including paratroop drops on some of the oil refineries. Later in the conflict they served primarily as defensive units.
While many of the Keibitai and Bobitai units could be considered 2nd line units, the SNLF forces were generally well trained, excellent troops with high morale. SNLF units executed many successful landings early in the war, and moved quickly and efficiently from objective to objective. While other Navy ground units of lower quality are often referred to as SNLF, they were not and it is this misidentification which leads to the myth that SNLF troops were less reliable than they actually were
Official US Marine Corps publications include the following comments on SNLFs:
|
|
"Naval units of this type are usually more highly trained and have a greater tenacity and fighting spirit than the average Japanese Army unit." "Imperial Marines have earned the respect of their American counterparts for their espirit, discipline, marksmanship, proficiency with heavy weapons, small unit leadership, manifest bravery, and a stoic willingness to die to the last man." |
|
|
"These defenders were pretty tough, and they were big, six foot, the biggest Japs I ever saw!" |
|
|
"Their equipment was excellent and there was plenty of surplus found, including large amounts of ammo." |
Sources
|
Senshi Sosho: Philipine, Malay Kaigun Shinko Sakusen (War History Series: Philippines-Malaya-Navy Assault Operations" |
|
Attached Chart 1 to Senshi Sosho: Daihonei Kaigunbu, Rengo Kantai (2) (War History Series: Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department, Combined Fleet (2)) |
|
USMC comments from : Across the Reef, the Marine Assault on Tarawa, by Col Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (ret) |
 |
|
